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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
As set forth in the Opening Brief, the state failed to show there was a course of conduct 
consisting ofrepeated acts ofnonconsensual contact as required by I.C. § 18-7906. As nothing 
in the record or the Brief for Respondent supports the district court's contrary conclusion, this 
Court should vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
The entirety of the state's argument is that "the statute does not require a 'break in the 
contact.' Rather, it only requires 'repeated acts of non-consensual contact', with 'nonconsensual 
contact' being further defined as including certain types of actions." State's Brief, pg. 9-10. 
However, in context, the acts must occur on separate occasions to be "repeated acts," rather than 
"serial acts" or just "acts." Under the district court and state's interpretation of the statute, a 
person could be convicted upon evidence of one occasion of following by foot, if the victim 
jaywalked across the street but the defendant waited for the proper signal before resuming. This 
Court should decline to read the statute so broadly because "[ c ]onstructions of a statute that 
would lead to an absurd result are disfavored." State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 178,267 P.3d 
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2011) citing State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,275, 92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); 
State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 1 
In this case, there was only one continuous incident of nonconsensual contact. Even if 
Ms. Eliasen's action may be said to have changed from surveilling to following and back again 
1 The lack ofldaho precedent as to the meaning of the phrase "repeated acts of one 
consensual contract" is likely the result of no one else ever being charged, much less convicted, 
of stalking based upon a single continuous incident. This case may be the exception to the rule 
due to prosecutorial overreaching and jury sympathy caused by the fact that the complaining 
party is a police officer's wife. This suspicion is supported by the fact that the entire case is 
based upon the testimony of that one person with no corroborating witnesses or physical 
evidence and no confession or admission of any kind in stark contrast to the typical stalking case. 
during the incident there was only one incident of nonconsensual contact. That is not sufficient 
to sustain the conviction under the plain language of the statute. See City of Seattle v. Meah, 297 
P.3d 69, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (Where the district court's "view that a change in the nature 
of the conduct that a defendant engages in creates a sufficient break in the events to demonstrate 
a course of conduct through repeated acts of nonconsensual contact with a victim" was rejected.)2 
Iii. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, this Court cannot determine, 
based upon its independent consideration of the evidence, that there was substantial and 
competent evidence to support the verdict. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 501, 36 P.3d 1287, 
1289 (Ct. App. 2001). The state's evidence is also constitutionally insufficient because, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could find the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 
(1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979). Desiree Eliasen asks this Court to vacate 
the judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
d'-
Respectfully submitted thi~( day of May, 2014. 
~~(S~-\~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Desiree Eliasen 
2 At the same, the district court's interpretation would also permit conviction if, in the 
hypothetical above, the complaining witness stopped at the crosswalk. That would "cause a 
change in the nature of the conduct" from following to surveilling and then back to following 
when the witness began to walk again, ad infinitum. As previously argued, the behavior of the 
complaining witness should not determine whether there is a single occurrence of contact or 
multiple instances (and thus criminal liability). 
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